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THE RETURN OF SPENDING LIMITS:
CAMPAIGN FINANCE AFTER LANDELL V.
SORRELL
Richard Briffault*

INTRODUCTION
On August 18, 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that the First Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court
in Buckley v. Valeo, 1 does not preclude mandatory limitations on campaign
expenditures. 2 In Landell v. Sorrell, 3 the court concluded that limitations
imposed by the state of Vermont on candidate spending in state election
campaigns are “supported by [the state’s] compelling interests in
safeguarding Vermont’s democratic process from 1) the corruptive
influence of excessive and unbridled fundraising and 2) the effect that
perpetual fundraising has on the time of candidates and elected officials.”4
To be sure, the court declined to uphold the Vermont limits and, instead,
remanded the case to the district court for a determination of whether the
challenged spending limits are the “least restrictive means” of “furthering
the State’s compelling anti-corruption and time-protection interests.”5
Nevertheless, Landell is potentially one of the most important decisions in
the evolution of modern campaign finance law as it marks the first time
since Buckley that a court has held that a candidate expenditure limitation
can be constitutional.
Although path-breaking, Landell is not entirely unprecedented. In recent
years, several communities have sought to challenge Buckley by adopting

*Vice-Dean & Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School;
B.A., Columbia, 1974; J.D., Harvard, 1977.
1. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
2. Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for reh’g en banc denied, No.
00-915(L), 2005 WL 826151 (2d Cir. Feb. 11, 2005). The order denying the rehearing en
banc was filed on February 5, 2005, and amended on April 11, 2005, April 20, 2005, and
May 11, 2005 to reflect dissenting and concurring opinions. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 97 (internal citation omitted).
5. Id.
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spending limits for local 6 or state judicial candidates.7 These restrictions
were invalidated on the authority of Buckley, but a number of the judges
who heard the challenges to these laws displayed some restiveness with
Buckley’s rejection of spending limitations. 8 So too, although the Supreme
Court has for nearly three decades continued to adhere to Buckley, aspects
of the Court’s recent campaign finance decisions suggest the Court might
be open to rethinking Buckley’s premises. 9 Landell could very well
provide the Court with the opportunity to reconsider Buckley. 10
The Landell opinion, while very significant, is also limited in several
respects. The Second Circuit’s suggestion that voluntary public funding
with spending limits may be a less restrictive means of attaining the goals
of spending limits is troubling, and threatens to pit these two
complementary tenets of campaign finance reform against each other.
Moreover, although Landell challenges Buckley’s conclusion concerning
spending limits, it still works largely within Buckley’s basic conceptual
framework. As a result, the Second Circuit’s analysis does not reflect the
full range of possible justifications for spending limitations.
Part I of this Article will analyze the Landell decision and situate it in
the evolving judicial debate over campaign finance regulation. Part II will
discuss the question, raised by the Second Circuit for the Landell district
court on remand, whether spending limits are the least restrictive means of
attaining the compelling interests relied on by the court. Part III will then
examine those interests as well as other justifications for spending limits.
As I will suggest, the constitutionality of spending limits in principle11
would rest on a stronger foundation if other important interests directly

6. See Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998) (spending limitations
on candidates for Cincinnati City Council); Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 160 F. Supp.
2d 1266 (D.N.M. 2001) (spending limitations on candidates for Albuquerque city office).
7. See Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 1998) (spending limits adopted by the
Ohio Supreme Court, as amendments to the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, for judicial
elections).
8. See infra Part I.B (discussing the Homans and Kruse decisions).
9. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
10. Indeed, there is evidence that the Vermont law at issue in Landell was adopted for
that very purpose. See Landell, 2005 WL 826151, at *12 (Jacobs, J., dissenting)
(“Obviously, the Act was engineered to provide an opportunity for the Supreme Court to
revisit existing law in this area.”) (citing a statement by Vermont Secretary of State Deborah
L. Markowitz).
11. I emphasize that my argument supports spending limits in principle, not the specific
spending limits adopted by Vermont. As discussed infra at note 114, those limits are both
quite low and apply to a broad range of expenditures. Low limits can be in tension not only
with the free speech values usually asserted in opposition to spending limits but also with
the electoral competitiveness argument that supports spending limits. See infra notes 20102 and accompanying text.
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relevant to the financing of democratic elections, particularly electoral
competitiveness and voter equality, were taken into account.
I. LANDELL AND THE EVOLVING JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF
CANDIDATE EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS
A. Buckley v. Valeo
Modern campaign finance doctrine begins with the Supreme Court’s
holding in Buckley v. Valeo that campaign finance regulation directly
implicates fundamental First Amendment freedoms of speech and
association. 12 In so doing, Buckley sharply distinguished between limits on
The Court held that
contributions and limits on expenditures. 13
expenditures involve direct communications with the voters, and thus,
expenditure ceilings “impose direct and substantial restraints on the
quantity of political speech.” 14 As a result, any restriction on expenditures
must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny and narrowly tailored to promote
a compelling state interest.15 By contrast, the Court found that a
contribution does not entail an expression of political views; rather, it
“serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views,
but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support.” 16
Although contributions fund the communications of candidates, “the
transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by
someone other than the contributor.” 17 Thus, contribution restrictions do
not trigger the same exacting judicial review as spending limits. Moreover,
the Court found that contribution restrictions advance the compelling
government interests of preventing corruption and the appearance of
corruption. 18 As the Court noted, “[t]o the extent that large contributions
are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential
office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is
Based on the lower speech value of campaign
undermined.” 19
contributions and the compelling interest of preventing corruption and the

12. 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976).
13. Id. at 20-21.
14. Id. at 39.
15. Id. at 14-20 (holding that restrictions on campaign expenditures are to be treated as
restrictions on “the quantity and diversity of political speech” and, thus, subject to the
“exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment”).
16. Id. at 21.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 26-29.
19. Id. at 26.
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appearance of corruption, Buckley sustained the Federal Election Campaign
Act (“FECA”) limits on donations by individuals and political committees
to federal candidates and on aggregate annual donations by individuals for
federal election purposes. 20
In Buckley, however, the Court found that “[n]o governmental interest
that has been suggested is sufficient to justify” FECA’s limitations on
The Court considered three
expenditures by federal candidates.21
arguments for spending limits: 1) preventing corruption and the appearance
of corruption; 2) promoting candidate equality; and 3) holding down the
high and rising costs of campaigns. 22 Although the Court found that the
prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption were important
government interests, it determined that FECA’s contribution limits and
disclosure requirements already took care of the corruption problem. The
Court thus concluded that the goals of preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption could not justify the heavy burden on First
Amendment rights posed by FECA’s expenditure limits. 23 The Court also
specifically rejected the argument that expenditure restrictions are
necessary to reduce the incentive to circumvent contribution limits, finding
instead that “[t]here is no indication that the substantial criminal penalties
for violating the contribution ceilings combined with the political
repercussions of such violations will be insufficient to police the
contribution provisions.” 24
With respect to candidate equality, the Court found it was not clear that
spending limitations would promote equality. Rather, such limits could
operate “to handicap a candidate who lacked substantial name recognition
or exposure of his views before the start of the campaign.” 25 More
generally, the Court found that, with contribution limitations, different
levels of spending by candidates posed little concern: “[T]he financial
resources available to a candidate’s campaign, like the number of
volunteers recruited, will normally vary with the size and intensity of the
candidate’s support. There is nothing invidious, improper, or unhealthy in
permitting such funds to be spent to carry the candidate’s message to the

20. Id. at 23-38. Later cases sustained lower limitations on donations to candidates in
state elections, Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000), limitations on
donations to political action committees, Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981), a
ban on donations by corporations, FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003), and limitations
on donations to and by political parties, McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
21. 424 U.S. at 55.
22. Id. at 45, 53-57.
23. Id. at 55.
24. Id. at 56.
25. Id. at 57.
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electorate.” 26
As for the third argument for spending limitsholding down campaign
spending levelsthe Court held that there was simply no governmental
interest in limiting the amount of money spent on election campaigns. 27
Buckley invalidated not only limitations on candidate spending but also
FECA’s limits on so-called independent spending, that is, expenditures by
individuals and groups, acting independently of any candidate, to support
or oppose a candidate. 28 The Court held that the anti-corruption rationale
could not justify these restrictions because
“[t]he absence of
prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate . . .
alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for
improper commitments from the candidate.” 29 Nor could these limits be
justified by the “governmental interest in equalizing the relative ability of
individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections” since the
First Amendment precludes restricting the speech of some “to enhance the
relative voice of others.” 30
B. Recent Judicial Stirrings
Although the contribution/expenditure dichotomy and strict judicial
review of spending limits remain fundamental to the Supreme Court’s
campaign finance jurisprudence,31 in recent years some lower federal
courts have expressed discontent with Buckley’s apparent constitutional
preclusion of spending limits. These stirrings reflect grass-roots political
resistance to Buckley and foreshadowed the Second Circuit’s ruling in
Landell. The beginnings of a new judicial debate over spending limits can
be seen in Kruse v. City of Cincinnati 32 and Homans v. City of
Albuquerque. 33

26. Id. at 56.
27. See id. at 57.
28. See id. at 51-54.
29. Id. at 47.
30. Id. at 48-49. Subsequently, the Court invalidated independent expenditure
restrictions in the context of a publicly funded presidential election, FEC v. Nat’l
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985), and restrictions on the
independent expenditures of political parties, Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v.
FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
31. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 134-35 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Mo.
Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000).
32. 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998).
33. 217 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D.N.M. 2002), aff’d, 366 F.3d 900 (10th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied., 125 S. Ct. 625 (2004) [hereinafter Homans II]; 160 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (D.N.M.
2001), rev’d, 264 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Homans I].
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(1) Kruse v. City of Cincinnati

In 1995, the Cincinnati City Council adopted an ordinance imposing
campaign expenditure limitations on candidates for the council. 34 The
action appears to have been motivated in part by a desire to challenge
Buckley. 35 The city contended that the spending limit was justified by
Buckley’s concern with preventing corruption and the appearance of
corruption. It presented evidence that wealthy donors dominated the
financing of city elections, and that the overwhelming majority of local
residents believed that large contributors wielded undue influence over the
local political system. 36 The Sixth Circuit, however, held that Buckley
“foreclose[d] . . . as a matter of law” the use of the anti-corruption
argument to justify a spending limit. 37 The court went on to find that, as a
matter of fact, the city had failed to prove spending limits were strictly
necessary to prevent corruption since the city had not imposed contribution
limits prior to its adoption of spending limits. 38 Thus, the Sixth Circuit
held that the city had “no evidence that contribution limits are inadequate
to prevent actual and perceived quid pro quo corruption.” 39
The court also dismissed a new justification for spending
limitsreducing the time burden that fundraising poses for officeholders
and candidates. Kruse found this was no more than a restatement of the
argument, rejected in Buckley, that there is a compelling public interest in
reducing campaign costs. 40 Finally, the court determined that arguments
raised by the city that spending limits are necessary to enable candidates
without access to wealth to participate in the electoral process, and to
enable the voters to consider those candidates, were barred by Buckley’s
rejection of equality rationales for expenditure limitations. 41
One member of the Kruse panel, however, took issue with the dismissal
of the time-protection argument, and also raised the possibility that

34. Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 909 (6th Cir. 1998).
35. See id. at 910 (noting that proponents of the spending limits believed the city should
challenge Buckley).
36. Id. at 911.
37. Id. at 915. The court specifically concluded that Buckley barred the argument that
spending limits were necessary to eliminate the incentive to circumvent contribution limits.
Id.
38. Id. at 916.
39. Id. The court concluded that the city could not rely on the federal experience with
contribution limits in national elections to “support its contention that they will inevitably
prove inadequate at the local level.” Id. The court ascribed federal election problems to the
“‘soft-money’ loophole” in federal restrictions on contributions. Id.
40. See id. at 916-17 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976)).
41. Id. at 917-18.
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spending limitations could be justified by “the interest in preserving faith in
democracy.” 42 In his concurrence, Judge Cohn found that officeholder and
candidate time-protection and the prevention of “public cynicism” about
democracy attributable to unlimited spending are important interests that
are conceptually distinct from the concern about campaign costs dismissed
in Buckley. 43 Although Judge Cohn agreed with the majority that the city
had “failed to develop a compelling factual record” and thus concurred in
the result, he sought to leave an opening for future efforts to limit campaign
spending by concluding that “Buckley . . . is not a broad pronouncement
declaring all campaign expenditure limits unconstitutional.” 44 Rather, he
suggested that
[i]t may be possible to develop a factual record to establish that the
interest in freeing officeholders from the pressures of fundraising so they
can perform their duties, or the interest in preserving faith in our
democracy, is compelling, and that campaign expenditure limits are a
narrowly tailored means of serving such an interest. 45

(2) Homans v. City of Albuquerque
Three years later, Judge Cohn’s suggestion was embraced by Judge
Vazquez of the federal district court in New Mexico in a challenge to
Albuquerque’s spending limits for municipal elections. 46 Albuquerque had
adopted spending limits in 1974 and, amazingly enough, despite Buckley
those limits remained on the books and were apparently enforced through
1995. 47 The limits were temporarily enjoined in 1997, but restored and
amended in 1999. 48 When a mayoral candidate sought to enjoin their
enforcement in the 2001 race, Judge Vazquez denied the plaintiff’s request
for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the plaintiff had shown neither
a likelihood of success on the merits nor that the public interest would
benefit from an injunction. 49
Rather, the court found on the record that for more than two decades the
Albuquerque spending limits had promoted competitive elections,

42. Id. at 919 (Cohn, D.J., concurring).
43. Id. at 919-20.
44. Id. at 920.
45. Id.
46. Homans I, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (D.N.M. 2001), rev’d, 264 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir.
2001).
47. See Homans II, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1200 (D.N.M. 2002), aff’d, 366 F.3d 900
(10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied., 125 S. Ct. 625 (2004).
48. Id.
49. Homans I, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1273-74.
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increased citizen confidence in government, led to increased voter turnout,
reduced the role of large donors, created opportunities for lower-income
and lower-middle-income candidates, and generally improved the quality
of electoral campaigns without limiting the ability of candidates to
campaign effectively. 50 Based on that record, the court found the city had
demonstrated its spending limits were necessary to promote the compelling
governmental interest in “preserving the public faith in democracy, and
reducing the appearance of corruption.” 51 The district court also
concluded, based on the voter turnout data, that circumstances had changed
in the quarter-century since Buckley so that “it is clear today that the public
perception of Albuquerque citizens is that unlimited spending infects the
political process.” 52 The court echoed Judge Cohn’s opinion in Kruse in
citing the effect of the fundraising “arms race” in forcing candidates to
“spend innumerable hours eliciting contributions rather than performing
public duties or ascertaining the interests of those citizens unable to make
large financial contributions.” 53 The financial arms race, in turn, reinforced
the public perception of special interest domination of elections.54 By
ending the arms race and reducing the role of money in elections, the
Albuquerque spending limit was narrowly tailored to advance a compelling
government interest.55
Less than a week later, the Tenth Circuit reversed and held that the
interests identified by the district court were “really no different than the
interests deemed insufficient to justify expenditure limitations in Buckley”
and granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the
Albuquerque limits. 56
Subsequently, the district court conducted a full trial on the merits. The
court again found that unlimited campaign spending interfered with
competitive elections by giving incumbents an advantage. The court noted
that all the mayors seeking reelection in Albuquerque since the adoption of
spending limits had been defeated, compared with the eighty-eight percent
reelection rate of incumbent mayors in other cities.57 The court again
found that turnout in municipal elections had been higher in Albuquerque
under spending limits than in other cities without spending limits, and that
50. See id. at 1268-70.
51. Id. at 1272.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 1273.
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 264 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (10th Cir. 2001).
57. Homans II, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1200 (D.N.M. 2002), aff’d, 366 F.3d 900 (10th
Cir. 2004), cert. denied., 125 S. Ct. 625 (2004).
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Albuquerque voters considered their spending-limited elections to be less
influenced by special interest money than federal elections, in which
spending is not subject to limitation. 58 Looking at federal election
practices, the court found that it is easy for large donors to circumvent
Moreover, with unlimited
contribution limitations by bundling. 59
spending, candidates are “under a great deal of pressure to engage in
fundraising activities and to depend on the goodwill of their donors.”60
The court again concluded that the local spending limit did not interfere
with effective campaigning; indeed, five of the eight candidates, including
the winner and the second- and third-place finishers in the non-limited
2001 elections, spent less than the enjoined spending limit would have
allowed. 61 Ultimately, the district court determined, based on the Tenth
Circuit’s interpretation of Buckley, that it was “constrained to find” that the
city’s expenditure limits were unconstitutional.62 If the court had been free
to apply the analysis it had used in initially denying the preliminary
injunction, however, the limits would have been upheld as:
narrowly tailored to serve the compelling interests of deterring corruption
and the appearance of corruption, promoting public confidence in
government, permitting candidates and officeholders to spend less time
fundraising and more time performing their duties as representatives and
interacting with voters, increasing voter interest in and connection to the
electoral system, and promoting an open and robust public debate by
encouraging electoral competition. 63

In the final decision in the Homans saga, 64 a Tenth Circuit panel
affirmed the district court, but split over whether Buckley was an
insurmountable barrier to all spending limits, and whether time-protection
and electoral competition are compelling justifications for such limits.
Writing the “principal opinion” 65 for the panel, Judge Lucero determined

58. Id. at 1201.
59. See id. at 1202, 1205 n.2. Bundling is a “manipulative contribution device[] . . .
which enable[s] special interests to direct large quantities of money by way of individual
contributions to particular candidates.” Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 100 (2d Cir. 2004).
60. Homans II, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1201.
61. Id. at 1203-04.
62. Id. at 1206.
63. Id.
64. Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 366 F.3d 900 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.
Ct. 625 (2004) [hereinafter Homans III]..
65. Id. at 902; see id. at 914 n.1 (Tymkovich, J., concurring). In the concurring opinion,
joined by Judge O’Brien, Judge Tymkovich refers to the opinion of Judge Lucero as the
“principal opinion” even though two of the three members of the panel did not join its
interpretation of Buckley. Id.
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that Buckley was not a per se prohibition on spending limits. 66 Rather, he
concluded, Buckley resolved only the sufficiency of the arguments
specifically addressed by the Supreme Courtanti-corruption, equalization
of candidate resources, and limiting campaign costs“leav[ing] open the
possibility that at least in some circumstances expenditure limits may
withstand constitutional scrutiny.” 67 He determined that time-protection
was conceptually distinct from the cost-limitation argument rejected in
Buckley and could be a compelling interest justifying spending limits.68
Similarly, the state interest in promoting electoral competition was an
“interest distinct from” the candidate resources equalization argument
rejected in Buckley. 69 Indeed, Judge Lucero determined that Buckley’s
rejection of the anti-corruption and perception of corruption justifications
for spending limits turned on the particular circumstances of that case.70
Thus, it would be possible for a government to produce evidence that
expenditure limits are necessary to prevent corruption.
Ultimately, however, Judge Lucero, applying the strict scrutiny analysis
he agreed Buckley requires for judicial review of campaign expenditure
limitations, held that Albuquerque could not demonstrate that spending
limits were necessary to meet the compelling government interests
asserted. 71 The city had failed to present evidence that bundling practices
in Albuquerque actually circumvented contribution restrictions, that there
was undue special interest influence on government, or that spending limits
actually promoted public confidence in government. 72 The city had also
failed to produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the time burden of
fundraising was a “problem of constitutional proportions” in
Albuquerque 73 or that spending limits actually improved electoral

66. Id. at 902.
67. Id. at 906, 906 n.7.
68. Id. at 911-13.
69. Id. at 913.
70. See id. at 907-08.
71. Id. at 913.
72. Id. at 908-11. Judge Lucero specifically rejected the evidence that Albuquerque’s
spending limits had increased turnout. Id. at 909-10. Albuquerque’s higher voting rate,
compared with those of other cities, was apparently due to differences in the denominator:
the Albuquerque figures were based on registered voters while the turnout rate for other
cities was based on voting age population. Albuquerque turnout based on voting age
population was comparable to that in other cities. Id. at 910. Similarly, the court discounted
the significance of public opinion surveys that found Albuquerque residents had more
confidence in the integrity of spending-limited local elections compared with un-limited
federal elections. The difference was ascribed to the generally higher level of trust voters
have in local government, regardless of spending limits. Id.
73. Id. at 912.
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competition. 74
In his concurring opinion, Judge Tymkovich, joined by Judge O’Brien,
agreed with Judge Lucero that Buckley “did not adopt a per se rule against
campaign spending limits,” 75 thereby making the Tenth Circuit the first
appellate court since Buckley was decided to hold that campaign spending
limits could be constitutional. But Judge Tymkovich emphatically rejected
the arguments for spending limits considered by Judge Lucero. Instead, his
concurrence found that Buckley flatly precluded any justification of
spending restrictions in terms of the government interest in reducing
corruption. In accord with the Sixth Circuit in Kruse, the concurrence
further found the candidate time-protection argument to be subsumed in
Buckley’s rejection of a government interest in controlling election costs.76
Moreover, in an analysis foreshadowing the remand order in Landell, the
concurrence suggested that, even if time-protection could be considered a
distinct governmental interest, spending limits are not narrowly tailored to
further that interest since the provision of public funding for
candidatesor the imposition of higher contribution restrictionswould
reduce the time necessary for fundraising with less burden on First
Amendment rights. 77 Finally, the concurrence again disagreed with the
principal opinion, finding that Buckley’s rejection of equalization of
candidate resources as a compelling argument took care of the asserted
interest in electoral competition.78
Together, the Cincinnati and Albuquerque cases indicate some
discontent in the lower federal courts with the foundations of Buckley. The
Tenth Circuit concluded that Buckley does not adopt a per se rule against
spending limits, and judges on the Sixth Circuit and Tenth Circuit panels
found that such concerns as protecting officeholder time, promoting
electoral competition, vindicating popular faith in democracy, and even
preventing corruption may be compelling interests that justify spending
limits. In addition, the New Mexico federal district court found that, at the
very least, spending limits are consistent with effective challenges to
incumbents, high voter turnout, and effective campaigning. Of course, in
both cases, the appellate courts invalidated the spending limitations. But
Kruse and Homans may be said to have set the stage for the Second
Circuit’s determination in Landell that candidate spending limits can be

74.
75.
76.
1998).
77.
78.

Id. at 913.
Id. at 915 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
Id. at 917-18; accord Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 916-17 (6th Cir.
Homans III, 366 F.3d at 919 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
Id. at 919-20.
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constitutional.
C. Landell v. Sorrell
The Vermont Campaign Finance Act of 1997 (“Act”) consists of an
extensive package of campaign finance regulations, including restrictions
on contributions to candidates for state office, partial public funding for
candidates for governor, and mandatory expenditure restrictions on all
candidates for state office. 79 In the inevitable constitutional challenge that
followed enactment, the federal district court found the Act was the endproduct of a process that included extensive legislative deliberation which
resulted in legislative findings that rising spending levels denied some
Vermonters the opportunity to run for office, required candidates to devote
“inordinate amounts of time raising campaign funds,” and reduced “public
involvement and confidence in the electoral process.” 80 After a ten-day
bench trial, the district court agreed with the state that the evidence
“overwhelmingly demonstrated that the Vermont public is suspicious about
the effect of big-money influence over politics” 81 and that unlimited
campaign spending erodes public confidence in government and results in
both actual and perceived influence by large contributors on legislators.82
The court further found that “the need to solicit money from large donors at
times turns legislators away from their official duties” 83 The court
determined that the specific limits adopted by Vermont would not interfere
with effective campaigning. 84 In addition, relying in part on the reasoning
in the separate opinion of Judge Cohn in Kruse, the court found that
spending limits are an “effective response to certain compelling

79. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2801-2883 (2004).
80. Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 468 (D. Vt. 2000).
81. Id. at 468.
82. Id. at 469-70.
83. Id. at 468.
84. Id. at 472. Under the Act, candidates for state representative or local offices may
not accept more than $200 from any single source; state senate or county office candidates
are limited to single contributions of $300 each; governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of
state, state treasurer, auditor of accounts, or attorney general candidates may not accept
single contributions over $400; and political committees are limited to single source
contributions of $2000 or less. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 2805. Campaign expenditures are
also limited. For example, candidates for governor cannot spend more than $300,000 in any
two-year general election cycle, and lieutenant governor candidate expenditures are limited
to $100,000. Id. at § 2805(a). In finding that these limits did not hinder effective
campaigning in Vermont, the District Court noted that “[i]n Vermont legislative races, lowcost [campaigning] methods . . . are standard and even expected by the voters” and that
“Vermont ranks 49th out of the 50 states in campaign spending.” Landell, 118 F. Supp. 2d
at 472.
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governmental interests not addressed in Buckley,” including protecting
officeholders’ abilities to attend to their official duties, preserving faith in
democracy, and protecting access to the political arena. 85 The court found
“the state proved that each of these concerns exist, and that Vermont’s
The district court ultimately
expenditures limits address them.” 86
concluded, however, that Buckley v. Valeo required that the spending limits
be declared unconstitutional. 87
On appeal, the Second Circuit determined it was not so constrained by
Buckley. In both an initial opinion which was issued in August 200288 and
withdrawn just two months later 89 while a petition for rehearing en banc
was pending, and the amended opinion finally issued in August 2004, 90 the
Second Circuit panel determined that Buckley “did not rule campaign
expenditure limits to be per se unconstitutional, but left the door ajar for
narrowly tailored spending limits that secure clearly identified and
appropriately documented compelling governmental interests.” 91 Like
Judge Lucero in Homans, the court found that both the “corruptive
influence” of unlimited spending and “the effect the perpetual fundraising
has on the time of candidates and elected officials” were compelling
interests that could justify expenditure limitations.92 Unlike the Tenth
Circuit, however, the Landell panel, in an opinion by Judge Straub joined
by Judge Pooler, found that unlimited spending posed dangers of
corruption and the appearance of corruption that were not adequately
addressed by contribution limits. 93
Acknowledging that Buckley had concluded that the corruption danger
could be effectively met by contribution limits, so that the burden on
85. Landell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 482-83 (citing Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907,
920 (6th Cir. 1998) (Cohn, J., concurring); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v.
FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 649-50 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
86. Id. at 483.
87. Id.
88. Landell v. Vt. Pub. Interest Research Group, 300 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2002),
withdrawn, Landell v. Sorrell, No. 00-9159(L), 2002 WL 31268493, at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 3,
2002).
89. Landell, 2002 WL 31268493, at *1.
90. See Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 2004). The initial Second Circuit
opinion in Landell was assessed in Nathan Huff, Note, Landell v. Sorrell: Lessons Learned
from Vermont’s Pending Challenge to Buckley v. Valeo, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 239 (2003).
See also John T. Cooke, Making the Case for Campaign Finance: One Theory Explaining
the Withdrawal of Landell v. Sorrell, 27 VT. L. REV. 685, 685, 691-94 (2003) (noting that
the original decision directly challenged Buckley v. Valeo and discussing the majority and
dissenting opinions).
91. Landell, 382 F.3d at 97.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 108, 115-19.
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speech resulting from spending limits was not strictly necessary for
preventing corruption, Landell found “the reality of campaign financing in
Vermont” demonstrated that contribution limits alone were inadequate to
deal with the danger that state officials would be too compliant with the
wishes of large contributors. 94 In particular, the court noted that due to the
practice of “bundling” small contributions together, interest groups could
make their influence felt despite the limits on individual donations.95 With
unlimited spending, the resulting “arms race mentality has made candidates
beholden to financial constituencies that contribute to them.” 96 Due to
Buckley’s holding concerning the insufficiency of the anti-corruption
justification, the Second Circuit panel also relied on a second basis for
spending limitsprotecting the time of candidates and officeholders from
the burdens of fundraising. The court determined that this was a matter of
compelling government concern, which Buckley had not considered in its
analysis of expenditure limitations.97 The court found that the state of
Vermont had proven that “the pressure to raise large sums of money”
forces candidates to devote extra time to contributors, thus, “drastically
reduc[ing] opportunities that candidates have to meet with non-contributing
citizens.” 98 Drawing the anti-corruption and time protection arguments
together into a general concern for the “integrity of the electoral process,”99
the court concluded that the “basic democratic requirements” of
officeholder “accessibility” and “accountability” to constituents are
“imperiled when the time of public officials is dominated by those who pay
for such access with campaign contributions.” 100
Landell’s reliance on the anti-corruption justification is certainly in
tension with Buckley’s determination that spending limits are not necessary
to prevent corruption because contribution limits can vindicate anticorruption values while placing less of a burden on campaign speech. As
Landell found, however, as long as there is no limit on the potential costs
of a campaign, candidates (other than those who are personally wealthy)
will still need to collect massive amounts of contributions.101 Although
individual contributions are limited, intermediary organizations can
effectively “bundle” together the donations of individuals or associations
94. Id. at 118-19.
95. Id. at 118.
96. Id. at 119.
97. Id. at 120-21, 124.
98. Id. at 122.
99. Id. at 124 n.18 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000)
(Breyer, J., concurring)).
100. Id. at 125.
101. Id. at 121-22.
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with shared economic or ideological interests so that these groups continue
to play a key role in financing campaigns. Indeed, the combined effect of
limited contributions and unlimited spending is a powerful stimulus to the
activities of such campaign intermediaries, as their work benefits both
donors and candidates alike. 102 As a result, even with low contribution
limits, people affiliated with a particular group, interest, or sector can
together make large contributions to a candidate, with the candidate aware
of, and likely grateful for, their efforts. 103
Landell’s time-protection argument was not directly addressed by the
Supreme Court in its analysis of spending limits so the Second Circuit’s
analysis on this point is less of a direct challenge to Buckley than its
analysis of the anti-corruption justification. 104 As with the court’s reliance
on the danger of corruption, the argument is based on the structural tension
that arises when contribution limitations are limited but expenditures are
not. To raise the large and growing sums needed to finance campaigns
when contributions per donor are limited, candidates must devote everincreasing time and effort to pursuing potential contributors. With time a
scarce resource, these fundraising efforts necessarily cut into the time
available for candidates to meet with ordinary voters and for officeholders
to attend to “information gathering, political and policy analysis, debating
and compromising with fellow representatives, and the public
dissemination of views.” 105 As already noted, this argument was also
raised by one member of the Sixth Circuit panel in Kruse 106 and by a
member of the Tenth Circuit panel in Homans. 107 Moreover, Buckley
relied upon the public interest in reducing the time burdens of fundraising
when it upheld the optional public funding of presidential candidates. 108
In considering whether the spending limits were narrowly tailored to
promote the state’s compelling goals, the Landell majority found the
Vermont limits advance the state’s anti-corruption and time protection
102. Id. at 118-19.
103. Id.
104. For the intellectual foundation of the time-protection argument, see generally
Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why Campaign
Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281
(1994).
105. Id. at 1282-83.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43 (discussing Judge Cohn’s treatment of the
time-protection argument).
107. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Lucero’s finding that
the time-protection argument was conceptually different from the cost-limitation argument
rejected in Buckley). Justice Kennedy also raised this concern in Shrink Missouri. 528 U.S.
377, 409 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
108. 424 U.S. 1, 96 (1976).
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goals, and that the specific spending caps adopted are high enough to
permit “effective advocacy.” 109 But the Second Circuit determined that the
district court had not considered whether spending limits are the “least
restrictive means” for attaining these goals. 110 Specifically, the panel noted
that the district court had not considered whether a program of voluntary
spending limits, coupled with incentives to accept such limitssuch as
higher contribution limits or the provision of public funding to participating
candidateswould be “as effective in advancing the asserted interests”
justifying spending limits. 111 The Second Circuit remanded to the district
court the question of whether these alternative means would be as effective
in vindicating the state’s goals while imposing less of a burden on First
Amendment rights. 112
Judge Winter dissented. 113 Although much of his dissent focused on the
specific terms of the Vermont limitsincluding the application of a single
limit to both primary and general elections in the same election cycle, the
Act’s broad definition of expenditure, and the low level of the limits114he
109. Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 125-31 (2d Cir. 2004).
110. Id. at 97, 131.
111. Id. at 133.
112. Id. at 135-36, 136 n.25. The court also asked the district court on remand to
reexamine whether the specific spending limits in the law were constitutionally sound in
light of certain arguments raised by Judge Winter’s dissent. The district court had found,
and the panel had agreed, that the statutory spending limits were consistent with actual
levels of campaign spending in Vermont and thus would not impede effective advocacy.
Judge Winter, however, argued that data on past spending levels did not take into account
the costs of compliance with the new law, nor did they consider “related expenditures” on
behalf of a candidate by individuals or organizations other than the candidate, which the
Vermont law treats as both contributions by the entity making the expenditure and
expenditures of the candidate benefited. See id. at 166-68. The majority asked the district
court to take these factors into account in its reconsideration of the spending limits. Id. at
134 n.23.
113. Id. at 149 (Winter, J., dissenting). Judge Winter’s dissent was endorsed by four of
the dissenters from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc in the most laudatory
terms. Chief Judge Walker described Judge Winter’s dissent as “impassioned, insightful,
and carefully reasoned,” Landel v. Sorrell, No. 00-9159(L), 2005 WL 826151, at *2 (2d Cir.
Feb. 11, 2005), amended Apr. 11, 2005, Apr. 20, 2005, and May 11, 2005; Judge Jacobs
praised the Winter opinion as “scintillating . . . learned and witty,” id. at *9; Judge Cabranes
agreed that the Winter dissent was “comprehensive and fully persuasive . . . a tour de force.”
Id. at *13. Judge Wesley joined all three dissents without writing one of his own. Even
four of the judges who concurred in the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc agreed
that Judge Winter’s opinion was “thorough and forceful.” Id. at *1 (Sack, J., and Katzmann,
J., concurring).
114. Landell, 382 F.3d at 150-83. Four of the dissenters from the denial of the petition
for rehearing en banc also specifically adverted to the very low level of the spending limit
imposed by the Vermont law. See Landell, 2005 WL 826151, at *8 (“These limits are
drastically below realistic spending levels for competitive races.”) (Walker, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at *14 (“The particular expenditure limits imposed by Act 64 are so
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also determined that the majority’s justifications for spending limits were
precluded by Buckley. 115 Moreover, he criticized the majority’s decision to
remand the “least restrictive means” question to the district court, finding it
“self-evident” that “a combination of public and private financing with low
contribution limits is infinitely less restrictiveis actually speech
supportiveand accomplishes all the ostensible purposes” of the Vermont
spending limits.116
In February 2005, the full Second Circuit rejected a petition to rehear
Landell en banc. 117 Subsequently, five members of the court dissented
from the denial of the rehearing en banc, with four of the dissenters
emphatically rejecting the panel opinion and strongly asserting that
Buckley precluded any finding that Vermont’s spending limits could be
constitutional.118 The dissenters reiterated the traditional view that Buckley
bars the use of anti-corruption arguments to sustain spending limits,119
rejected out of hand the argument that officeholder time protection could be
a compelling government interest, 120 and, in impassioned terms, denounced
the very idea of expenditure limitations.121

Seven members of the Second Circuit joined in opinions
concurring in the denial of the rehearing en banc. This group
included Judges Straub and Pooler, who had been on the Landell
panel, and Judges Sack, Katzmann, Sotomayor, and B.D. Parker,
who joined in an opinion written by Judges Sack and Katzmann that
emphasized that the denial of rehearing en banc was based on the
Second Circuit’s longstanding tradition of rejecting en banc review
and was not a consideration of the merits. 122 Only Judge Calabresi’s
laughably low . . . .”) (Cabranes, J., dissenting).
115. 382 F.3d at 184.
116. Landell, 382 F.3d at 207.
117. Landell, 2005 WL 826151.
118. Chief Judge Walker and Judges Jacobs, Cabranes, Raggi, and Wesley dissented.
Judge Raggi’s brief dissent declined “to express an opinion on the merits,” and simply
concluded that “this case presents serious questions that warrant further consideration by the
whole court.” Id. at *14. Chief Judge Walker and Judges Jacobs, Cabranes, and Wesley
also disagreed with the panel’s resolution of the merits. Chief Judge Walker and Judges
Jacobs and Cabranes each wrote an opinion which was joined by the other judges who
dissented on the merits.
119. See id. at *5 (Walker, C.J., dissenting); id. at *10 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
120. See id. at *6 (Walker, C.J., dissenting); id. at *10 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
121. See id. at *2 (panel opinion sets a “dangerous precedent”) (Walker, C.J., dissenting);
id. at *13 (“The Act at issue in this case is as unconstitutional as if Vermont were to create a
dukedom, apply a thumbscrew, or tax Wisconsin cheese.”) (Jacobs, J., dissenting); id. at *14
(stating they were “bald-faced political protectionism”) (Cabranes, J., dissenting).
122. See id. at *1 (Sack, J., and Katzmann, J., concurring); see also id. (citing Jon O.
Newman, In Banc Practice in the Second Circuit: The Virtues of Restraint, 50 BROOK. L.
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separate concurrence addressed the First Amendment issues
presented by Vermont’s expenditure limitation. More radically than
the panel majority, Judge Calabresi directly challenged Buckley’s
framing of the constitutionality of campaign finance regulation solely
in terms of the prevention of corruption and the appearance of
corruption. Instead, he made inequality the centerpiece of his
analysis. As he put it, the impact of wealth inequalities on elections
is “the huge elephant—and donkey—in the living room in all
discussions of campaign finance reform.” 123 Indeed, he suggested,
“it is not entirely out of the question” that equality as well as anticorruption and time-protection concerns were behind Vermont’s
decision to adopt candidate spending limits. 124 “[T]he sort of
conversation taking place in Vermont (and elsewhere) would be a far
more fruitful one—from the standpoints both of campaign finance
policy and constitutional jurisprudence—were it able to be brought
out from under Buckley’s corruption mantle and into a framework
that more honestly reflects the issues at play.” 125 Judge Calabresi
concluded that the Supreme Court’s reconsideration of Buckley to
permit consideration of equality arguments is “essential” to a “free
and open discussion” of campaign finance regulation, and that the
best way to speed that reconsideration was to deny rehearing en banc
and move Landell closer to Supreme Court review. 126
The sharpness of the division within the Second Circuit, both
within the Landell panel and over the decision whether to hear the
REV. 365, 371 (1984) (noting that the Second Circuit voted to hear only six cases en banc,
while denying petitions for rehearing in nineteen cases between 1979 and 1983)). These
four concurring judges avoided any comment on the First Amendment merits of the case,
except to say “we doubt it,” id. at *1, n.3, in response to the contention of Judge Jacobs that
the Landell panel’s decision was attributable to the “many constitutional-law professors and
news media [that] lend their prestige and voice to such measures.” Id. at *12.
123. Id. at *1.
124. Id. at *1. Judge Calabresi saw campaign spending limitations as implicitly raising
two types of inequality concerns. “The first is the generalized egalitarian desire not to
advantage one group in society over another.” Id. In the campaign finance setting, that
means “the deeply felt desire not to have the wealthy be able to influence elections more
than the poor.” Id. Second, he suggested that unlimited campaign spending privileges the
ability of the wealthy, relative to the poor, to “express the intensity of their political
feelings. . . . In other words, and crucially, a large contribution by a person of great means
may influence an election enormously, and yet may represent a far less intensity of desire
than a pittance given by a poor person.” Id. Judge Calabresi indicated that this differential
wealth-bounded ability to express intensities of political feelings is a First Amendment
concern—“the First Amendment right to have one’s intensity of desire, as expressed in
monetary terms, be measured equally.” Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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case en banc, coming shortly after the Tenth Circuit’s Homans
decision that Buckley is not an absolute bar to spending limits,
clearly demonstrates the increasingly intense conflict within the
lower courts concerning the meaning of Buckley and the future of
campaign finance jurisprudence.
D. Landell and the Supreme Court’s Evolving Campaign Finance
Jurisprudence
Landell is a sharp break from Buckley’s rejection of candidate spending
limits, but it is in some respects foreshadowed by other developments in the
Supreme Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence, particularly the Court’s
recent decision in McConnell v. FEC. 127 Indeed, the Second Circuit panel
repeatedly invoked McConnell in its Landell decision. 128 Landell’s
reliance on McConnell is, in some sense, curious since McConnell upheld
the “soft money” restrictions of the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), and “soft money” consists of contributions to
parties, rather than expenditures by candidates. 129 Indeed, McConnell
restated Buckley’s contribution/expenditure distinction, 130 and relied on it
in justifying the application of the lower standard of review used for
contribution limits to BCRA’s soft money restrictions. 131 Yet, the Second
Circuit’s use of McConnell does accurately capture the Supreme Court’s
increasingly deferential approach to campaign finance regulation,
McConnell’s recognition that campaign finance restrictions advance as
well as burden constitutional values, and the relevance of the justifications
for soft money regulation to spending limitation. In addition to McConnell,
although the Supreme Court has never directly challenged Buckley’s

127. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
128. See, e.g., Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 97 nn.1-2, 108, 108 n.6, 11-15, 116 n.11,
117 n.12, 118 n.13, 124, 124 n.17 (2d Cir. 2004). Judge Calabresi’s concurrence in the
denial of rehearing en banc also saw in McConnell a “broader understanding of the
‘corruption’ rationale than what Buckley enunciated—an understanding that could perhaps
be read as gesturing toward some of the ‘equality’ considerations that Buckley purportedly
purged from the debate.” See Landell, 2005 WL 826151 at *1 n.6.
129. See 540 U.S. at 224. According to Federal Election Commission member Bradley
A. Smith “[a]ny money that is not contributed directly to a candidate’s campaign or used
expressly to advocate the election or defeat of a candidate constitutes a form of soft money,
although the term is used most often when discussing such donations made to political
parties.” BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH 185 (2001).
130. 540 U.S. at 120-21.
131. Id. at 134-37. The dissenters from the denial of the rehearing en banc in Landell
emphasized McConnell’s limitation to contribution restrictions, and its implicit preservation
of the contribution/expenditure distinction. See Landell, 2005 WL 826151 at *3 (Walker,
C.J., dissenting).
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treatment of spending limitations, other decisions by the Court are in
tension with Buckley’s holding.
First, the Supreme Court has actually upheld expenditure limits. In
McConnell, the Court upheld bans on both corporate and labor union
election spending. 132 Prior to McConnell, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce 133 sustained a state law banning corporate election
expenditures, finding the prohibition justified by a compelling interest in
controlling “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
wealth” which could “unfairly influence elections when . . . deployed in the
form of independent expenditures.” 134 Austin suggests a concern about the
inequality of political influence, notwithstanding Buckley’s rejection of
inequality as a justification for spending limits.
To be sure, Austin found that corporate spending poses a unique danger
of corruption because corporations enjoy a “unique state-conferred
corporate structure” that enables them to accumulate large sums of
money. 135 A corporation’s financial resources reflect the success of the
corporation’s commercial activities and not the extent of support for its
political ideas. Limits on corporations have, thus, been held to be justified
“to ensure that substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special
advantages which go with the corporate form of organization . . . [are]
not . . . converted into political ‘war’ chests.” 136 Yet, Austin’s attempt to
limit its concern with large campaign war chests to corporations is
unpersuasive. It is hard to see why a corporation’s state-granted
advantages make its speech any more corrupting than the speech of wealthy
individuals or noncorporate groups. Moreover, as Justice Scalia pointed
out in his Austin dissent, corporations are not alone in receiving special
advantages from the state. 137 Other business associationsas well as
billionaire individuals who benefit from inheritance laws or obtain their
wealth from investments in corporationsmay build up campaign war
chests “that have little or no correlation to the public’s support” 138 for their
political ideas.139 Nor is it clear how Austin’s reasons for limiting
corporate spending justify the limits on union spending upheld in
132. 540 U.S. at 201-02. McConnell is the first decision in the post-Buckley era that
expressly treats the prohibition on both corporations and unions against using their treasury
funds in election campaigns as constitutional.
133. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
134. Id. at 660.
135. Id.
136. FEC v. Nat. Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207 (1982) (citations omitted).
137. 494 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 660.
139. See id. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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McConnell. Although the Court has doctrinally bracketed corporations and
unions as special cases, the only justification for the corporate and union
spending limits that the Court has articulated sounds a lot more like the
equality rationale rejected in Buckley than the corruption concern that has
been the only formally recognized basis for limiting campaign finance
activities.
Second, the Court in McConnell significantly reframed the way it
addresses the constitutionality of campaign finance regulation. Tracking
the formulation articulated by Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
concurring in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 140 McConnell
treated campaign finance laws not simply as burdens on speech and
association, but as positive “measures aimed at promoting the integrity of
the [political] process.” 141 Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Shrink
Missouri suggested that campaign finance law involves not one set of
constitutional principlesfreedom of speech and associationbut the
reconciliation of “competing constitutional interests,” including the
promotion of democracy. 142 Moreover, McConnell followed the Shrink
Missouri Breyer concurrence in giving a striking degree of judicial
deference to legislative judgments on campaign finance regulation.
McConnell repeatedly recognized Congress’s “particular expertise”143
concerning the impact of specific campaign finance practices and their
effects on both elections and government decision-making. 144 Indeed, the
Court deferred to Congress not just with respect to political facts and
electoral predictions, but also concerning the weight to be given to those
facts and predictions in balancing democracy-promoting regulation against
the speech and associational rights of parties and interest groups.145
Finally, both Justice Kennedy’s dissent and Justice Breyer’s concurrence
in Shrink Missouri, as well as the opinion for the Court in McConnell,
focused attention on the “post-Buckley experience” 146 in considering the
constitutional questions posed by campaign finance regulation. Justice
Kennedy lamented that “Buckley has not worked,” 147 explaining that “by
accepting half of what Congress did (limiting contributions) but rejecting

140. See 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
141. 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003).
142. 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring).
143. 540 U.S. at 137.
144. See id. at 153, 156, 157, 165, 167, 185, 207.
145. Id. at 137.
146. 528 U.S. at 405 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing id. at 406-09 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting)).
147. Id. at 408 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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the other (limiting expenditures)” 148 Buckley “created a misshapen system”
marked by massive avoidance of contribution limits. 149 Although Justice
Kennedy indicated he preferred to invalidate both contribution and
expenditure limits, he was willing to “leave open the possibility that
Congress, or a state legislature, might devise a system in which there are
some limits on both expenditures and contributions.” 150 He specifically
noted that a benefit of such a system is that it would “permit[]
officeholders to concentrate their time and efforts on official duties rather
than on fundraising.” 151 Justice Breyer suggested that a review of the postBuckley experience might lead the Court to “mak[e] less absolute the
contribution/expenditure line, particularly in respect to independently
Without directly challenging the
wealthy candidates.” 152
contribution/expenditure line, McConnell relied heavily on the postBuckley experience in concluding that the distinction Buckley had drawn
between “express advocacy” and “issue advocacy” was “functionally
meaningless,” thereby upholding BCRA’s restrictions and requirements
with respect to electioneering communication.153 So, too, the McConnell
Court agreed that the extensive post-Buckley efforts by candidates,
contributors, and interest groups alike to avoid Buckley’s limits justified
BCRA’s aggressive anti-circumvention provisions.154
Thus, although McConnell does not directly challenge Buckley’s
approach to expenditure limitations and, indeed, relies on it in validating
BCRA’s limits on soft money contributions, McConnell’s concern for
democratic values, its deference to Congressional fact-finding, and its
willingness to reconsider aspects of the campaign finance doctrine
articulated in Buckley in light of the post-Buckley experience all indicate
that the Landell majority’s repeated invocation of McConnell is entirely
appropriate. McConnell, the separate opinions in Shrink Missouri, and the
Court’s partial reliance on inequality concerns in Austin, together suggest
that, while Landell surely represents a sharp break from Buckley, it is not
entirely out of step with the Supreme Court’s evolving campaign finance
jurisprudence.

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 407.
Id.
Id. at 409.
Id.
Id. at 405 (Breyer, J., concurring).
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 193 (2003).
Id. at 185.
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II. THE LANDELL REMAND: IS PUBLIC FUNDING A LESS RESTRICTIVE
ALTERNATIVE TO SPENDING LIMITS?
In ordering a remand, the Landell panel raised the surprising possibility
that two longstanding and traditionally complementary tenets of campaign
finance reform— public funding and spending limits— may, ironically, be
in conflict with each other. Although the Second Circuit found that both
the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption and the
protection of candidate time from the burdens of fund-raising are
compelling constitutional concerns that could justify candidate spending
limits, the court asked the district court to consider on remand whether
there are less constitutionally burdensome means of achieving those
goals. 155 Specifically, the appeals court directed the district court to assess
whether the possibility that the Vermont legislature could adopt a program
of voluntary public funding, with spending limits accepted by candidates as
a condition for receiving public funds, is such a less restrictive means. 156 If
so, then spending limits would be unconstitutional.
Judge Winter, in his dissent, found it “self-evident” that public funding
would be a less restrictive way of “freeing candidates of improper influence
from particular donors and relieving candidates of the need for extensive
fundraising.” 157 He concluded that a remand was unnecessary to address
the less restrictive means question since the possibility of public funding
was certainly a less constitutionally burdensome way of achieving the
state’s goals than mandatory spending limits. 158
Judge Winter is correct in noting that public funding can reduce both the
time burdens of fundraising and the ability of private interest groups to reap
the quid pro quo benefits of providing candidates with financial support
since public funding by definition provides candidates with an alternative
to private fundraising. But, although public funding is an alternative to
spending limits, it should not be treated as a less restrictive means than
spending limits of promoting these goals.
First, all existing public funding systems include spending limits. Thus,
they burden campaign speech as much as spending limits without public
funding. To be sure, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of

155. Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 148 (2d Cir. 2004).
156. Id. at 131-33.
157. Id. at 207 (Winter, J., dissenting); see also Homans III, 366 F.3d 900, 914 (10th Cir.
2004) (mentioning public funding as an alternative version of campaign finance reform).
158. Landell, 382 F.3d at 207.
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these limits on the theory that they are voluntarily agreed to by the
candidate who has chosen to accept public funding. 159 But that assumes
candidates have the right to decline public funding (and the concomitant
limits). If that is the case, then optional public funding, even with limits,
will not be an effective way of achieving the anti-corruption and timeprotection interests approved by the Landell court.
Of course, a public funding system without spending limits is
theoretically possible. In such a program of floors without ceilings,
candidates could be given a basic amount of public funds to assure all
candidates the ability to compete at some appropriate level, but then
candidates would be free to raise whatever they can and to spend whatever
they can raise. This would not burden speech, but candidates would remain
free to amass and use unlimited private donations. Such a system would be
largely ineffective in attaining the anti-corruption and time-protection goals
relied on by the Landell court.
Second, even assuming a voluntarily-accepted spending limit as a
condition for public funding is somehow both less of a burden on speech
and equally effective in achieving the anti-corruption and time-protection
goals, it should not be treated as a less restrictive alternative in the
constitutional sense. A program should be considered a less restrictive
alternative to an enacted program only if it is similar in kind to the enacted
program and comparably available politically. 160 Thus, a higher spending
limit would be a less restrictive alternative to a lower spending limit,
although it might be less effective at reaching the spending limit’s goals.
So, too, a higher contribution limit would be a less restrictive and
potentially effective alternative for attaining the time-protection goals of a
spending limit, although it could undermine the anti-corruption goal. Both
a higher contribution limit and a higher spending limit are similar in kind to
a lower spending limit, as they both involve restrictions on the raising and
spending of private campaign funds. These alternatives are both
presumably politically available to the legislature that adopted a lower
spending limit.
Public funding, however, is a totally different type of government
intervention into the financing of a political campaign. By providing
candidates with taxpayer dollars, rather than by limiting private funds,
public funding changes the structure of the campaign finance system. It is,
thus, a significant departure from both traditional forms of campaign
159. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65 (1976) (treating a candidate acceptance of
spending limits as a condition for public funding as voluntary).
160. See Blasi, supra note 104, at 1318 (noting that an optional system might increase
time spent fundraising).
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finance and traditional forms of campaign finance regulation. Moreover, as
Federal Election Commission Chairman Bradley Smith has noted, there is
an “almost endless array” of public funding systems. 161 Adopting a public
funding system involves complex choices concerning which candidates are
to get funds, how much funding any candidate is to get, what is the basis
for deciding how much a candidate gets, and what conditions apply to
publicly funded candidates.162 Some public funding systems, like that used
in the presidential general election, provide qualifying candidates with a
flat grant. 163 Others match some fraction of private contributions, although
at varying ratios of public dollars to private dollars.164 In short, public
funding presents many complex questions that are totally different from
those raised by contribution and spending limits.
Not only is public funding categorically distinct from contribution and
expenditure limitations, but public funding is also quite controversial.
Although, as I have argued elsewhere, public funding would be an
extremely positive campaign finance reform, 165 public funding has drawn
considerable political and ideological opposition.
Whereas most
jurisdictions impose some limitations on contributions, only a relatively
small number provide public funding. 166 Public funding is often derided as
“welfare for politicians.” Certainly, as Chairman Smith has noted, “[t]here
are many who have a blanket objection to any government financing of
campaigns as inherently beyond the scope of . . . good government.”167
Indeed, in Congress the Republican Party has opposed public funding as
“an issue of principle” 168 as well as on political grounds. It is doubtful that
a measure that is both so different from spending and has drawn such
consistent political and philosophical opposition should be considered an
available alternative to spending limits.
Third, public funding may not be as effective at advancing the anticorruption and time-protection goals cited by the Second Circuit unless

161. SMITH, supra note 129, at 89.
162. See id. at 88-105.
163. Id. at 96. “Matching” funds of up to $250 per contribution are provided to all
candidates seeking his or her party nomination who raises at least $5000 in each of twenty
states in amounts of $250 or less. Id.
164. Id. at 97.
165. See generally Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 563 (1999) [hereinafter Briffault, Public Funding] .
166. See id. at 566-67 (noting that public funding is used in presidential elections as well
as in statewide elections in Minnesota and Wisconsin, and in local elections in New York
City and Los Angeles).
167. SMITH, supra note 129, at 89.
168. See Blasi, supra note 104, at 1318.
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mandatory spending caps are imposed even on candidates who do not
accept public funds. As long as candidates are free to opt out of public
funding (and the spending limits that are a part of all public funding
programs), some candidates will do so. There will be candidates who will
want to spend well above the public funding limit and who believe they
will be able to raise the funds that will enable them to do so. These will
often be candidates who are either backed by extensive fundraising
networks, or are personally wealthy. George W. Bush, who opted out of
the presidential pre-nomination public funding limits in 2000 and 2004,
exemplifies the first category, as does John Kerry, who also opted out of
the presidential primary public funding system in 2004.169 Michael
Bloomberg, who drew on his enormous personal wealth to opt out of New
York City’s mayoral public funding system in 2001, exemplifies the second
category. 170
Not only do the candidates in the first category create corruption,
appearance of corruption, and time-burden problems for themselves, but
both types of opt-out candidates re-create the corruption, appearance of
corruption, and time burden problems for their opponents and the electoral
system as a whole. So long as some candidates are able to spend without
limit, there will be pressure on their opponents to raise and spend amounts
that will match the high-spenders. This will tend to force some candidates
who might have preferred to take public funding with spending limits to
opt for private funding without limits. This is particularly likely to occur
when the public funding level is not high enough to support effective
campaigning. Due to the political resistance to public funding previously
mentioned, even when public funding systems are adopted, they are often
underfunded and so do not provide adequate resources to participating
candidates. 171 But in any event, due to opt-outs, so long as public funding
is voluntary, it will not be as effective in attaining the anti-corruption and
time-protection goals as mandatory spending limits.
Public funding should be seen not as an alternative to spending limits,
but as a complement to it, and vice versa. Spending limits with public
funding will do a better job of reducing the potentially corruptive effects of
campaign contributions and reducing the time burdens of fundraising than

169. See Campaign Legal Ctr., Presidential Public Funding System: Problems of the
Public Funding System, at http://www.campaignfinanceguide.org/guide-53.html (last visited
May 6, 2005).
170. See PAUL RYAN, CTR. FOR GOV’T STUDIES, A STATUTE OF LIBERTY: HOW NEW YORK
CITY’S CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW IS CHANGING THE FACE OF LOCAL ELECTIONs 2, available
at http://www.cgs.org/publications/docs/nycreport.pdf.
171. See Briffault, Public Funding, supra note 165, at 586, 568 n.73.
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spending limits without public funding. After all, without public funding,
even candidates subject to spending limits must still spend time and effort
in raising funds and they will still be dependent on the financial support of
their contributors. Personally wealthy candidates, of course, are not
subject to the potentially corruptive effects of private contributions and are
not burdened by the requirements of fundraising. Most candidates,
however, are not wealthy enough to fund their own campaigns, nor would
it be desirable to solve the corruption and time-protection problems by
restricting elective office to the rich. Public funding, as Judge Winter
noted, theoretically solves the corruption and time-burden problems while
actually providing new resources for electoral communication which can be
particularly beneficial to political newcomers and challengers.172 But, in
practice, the effectiveness of public funding would be greatly strengthened
if all candidates were subject to spending limits.
III. MAKING THE CASE FOR SPENDING LIMITS
Although Landell did not uphold Vermont’s spending limits, the Second
Circuit did find that spending limits could be constitutional. The court read
Buckley’s invalidation of FECA’s spending limits as just a rejection of the
specific justifications put forward and considered by the Supreme Court.173
Buckley found only that “[n]o governmental interest that has been
suggested is sufficient to justify” the First Amendment burden created by
FECA’s spending limits; 174 but, Landell found, Buckley did not hold that
there is no governmental interest that could justify limits.
More controversially, the Landell court determined that, in light of the
changed campaign finance circumstances since Buckley, one of the
arguments for spending limits that was rejected by Buckleythe prevention
of corruption and the appearance of corruptioncan now provide a
constitutionally sufficient justification for limits.175 Unlike Buckley, the
Second Circuit found that, in the absence of spending limits, contribution
limits have failed to stem the corruption danger because the need for
unlimited funds compels candidates to turn to intermediaries and bundlers
in their quest for campaign money. 176 Despite this departure from Buckley,
Landell still hews to Buckley’s basic approach of focusing on the impact of
the process of raising the funds necessary to pay for unlimited spending on

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 106-10 (2d Cir. 2004).
Buckley v. Veleo, 424 U.S. 1, 55 (1976).
See Landell, 382 F.3d at 115-19.
See id. at 118.
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the behavior of officeholders and the consequences for governance. Like
Buckley, Landell focused on the potentially corrupting effects of the pursuit
of contributions on the integrity of officerholder decisions, and on the
potential effects of the appearance of such corruption on public confidence
in government. 177 Landell added to Buckley’s corruption concern
consideration of the distracting effect unlimited fundraising has on
officeholder time and governance.178 But in looking at the impact on a
campaign spending practice on governance rather than on the election
itself, Landell is still on the same wavelength as Buckley.
As I will suggest in the next two sections of this Part, although Landell’s
governance concerns are important, it is uncertain whether, by themselves,
they provide a constitutionally sufficient basis to justify spending limits.
The constitutional case for spending limits becomes clearer when the
impact of unlimited spending—which, of course, means unequal
spending—on fundamental features of democratic elections, particularly
electoral competitiveness and voter equality are taken into account.
Electoral competition, voter equality, and concerns about governance
together form an overarching interest in democratic self-government which
may provide a constitutionally compelling case for spending limits.
A. The Prevention of Corruption and the Appearance of Corruption
The heart of Landell’s corruption justification is that Buckley failed to
anticipate how the rise of bundlingdue in part to the negative synergy of
limited contributions and unlimited spendingre-introduced the potential
for corruption and the appearance of corruption inherent in large
contributions back into the campaign finance system. 179 In revisiting this
aspect of Buckley, Landell drew comfort from language in McConnell in
which the Court indicated it was willing to reconsider some of its earlier
campaign finance judgments in light of the post-Buckley experience. 180
McConnell gave great weight to the rise of campaign finance practices that
enable candidates and donors to effectively circumvent FECA’s limits on
large contributions while abiding by the letter of the law. The “soft
money” which was the major target of BCRA allowed donors and
candidates to evade contribution restrictions by channeling large
contributions to political parties which could not have been given directly
177. See id. at 116-17.
178. See id. at 119-24.
179. Id. at 118 (explaining that bundling could lead to contributor dominance in political
campaigns, which could corrupt the process).
180. See id. at 118 n.13 (emphasizing that bundling can lead to the appearance of
corruption).
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to the candidates.181 McConnell not only upheld tight restrictions on the
soft money practices that had provoked Congress into enacting BCRA, but
also sustained limits on other practices which had not yet proven
problematic, but which Congress feared might become future conduits for
campaign finance law evasion. 182 The post-Buckley experience with
evasion thus led the Court both to sustain restrictions on campaign finance
practices that did not involve the direct transmission of funds from donors
to candidates and to defer to Congress’s judgment concerning what
campaign practices are likely to cause the same dangers of corruption and
the appearance of corruption as direct contributions to candidates.
Landell is no doubt right that McConnell would support regulation
aimed at preventing the corruption and appearance of corruption dangers
posed by bundling. Landell is also no doubt correct in finding that the
absence of spending limits poses a major incentive to bundling. But it is
not clear that a spending limit is the least constitutionally restrictive means
of addressing the bundling problem. One arguably less restrictive way of
dealing with the potentially corruptive consequences of bundling is direct
regulation of bundling itself. In the past, Congress considered legislation
that would treat contributions collected or arranged by an intermediary as
contributions of that intermediary, subject to contribution limits. 183 While
no such rule was adopted, the anti-bundling proposals suggest an
alternative means of addressing the potentially corruptive nature of the
bundled contributions that is less restrictive of candidate speech than
spending limits.
Buckley may have overstated the ability of contribution limits to address
the corruption danger by failing to consider how the interplay of
contribution limits and unlimited spending provides intermediaries and
bundlers with an opportunity to play a pivotal role in campaign finance,
thereby bolstering their influence on government. But it is not clear that
even this more sophisticated understanding of the corruption problem,
taken by itself, is sufficient to justify spending limits given the possibility
of attacking the bundling problem without directly capping spending. So
long as the only constitutionally cognizable justification for limiting
campaign finance practices is the corruptive effect of donations on
181. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 145-48 (2003).
182. See id. at 178-81 (upholding BCRA § 323(d), 2 U.S.C. § 441i(d) (2005)), 184-89
(upholding BCRA § 323(f), 2 U.S.C. § 441i(f)); see also Richard Briffault, McConnell v.
FEC and the Transformation of Campaign Finance Law, 3 ELECTION L.J. 147, 149, 167
(2004).
183. See, e.g., DAVID B. MAGLEBY & CANDICE J. NELSON, THE MONEY CHASE:
CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 193-94 (1990); FRANK J. SORAUF, INSIDE
CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALITIES 207-08 (1992).
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officeholders (and the demoralizing “appearance of corruption” on a
broader public aware of these contributions), spending limits will always be
subject to the argument than restrictions on contributions, including
bundling, are a less constitutionally burdensome means of achieving the
anti-corruption goal. Indeed, even the Second Circuit appeared to recognize
that the corruption and appearance of corruption concerns alone did not
provide the necessary constitutional predicate for spending limits when it
turned to a second justificationofficeholder and candidate time
protection.
B. Time Protection
The time-protection argument is a very appealing justification for
campaign spending limitation because it gets at some of the most disturbing
consequences of our campaign finance system—the distraction of
officeholders from the public business they are elected to address, and the
increasing tendency of the fundraising system to discourage potential
candidates from running for office. 184 Moreover, although the timeprotection concern was arguably before the Buckley Court, 185 the Court did
not discuss it in the context of spending limits so it cannot be said that
Buckley ruled out this justification for spending limits. Landell also
correctly concluded that the time-justification argument should not be
considered precluded by Buckley’s rejection of high and rising campaign
costs as a justification for spending limits since time protection addresses a
different concern. As a result, there is less of a precedential barrier to the
time-protection argument than to the anti-corruption argument. Indeed, an
important aspect of the time-protection argument is that begins to push the
campaign finance debate beyond the corruption/appearance of corruption
framework to consider the broader impact of our campaign finance system
on our political process. Yet the time-protection argument, like the antibundling concern, is still primarily focused on the impact of unlimited and
unequal spending on government decision-making, rather than on the
fairness of elections themselves.
Preliminarily, like the anti-bundling argument, the time-protection
justification may be open to the response that there is a less restrictive
fund-raising law change that would also protect candidate and officeholder
timean increase in the contribution limits. A key reason why candidates
184. See id. at 189 n.24 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
185. See Landell, 382 F.3d at 188-89 (Winter, J., dissenting) (noting that the timeprotection argument was relied on by the Court of Appeals in Buckley, was discussed in the
brief filed on behalf of the Attorney General and Solicitor General, and was mentioned by
the Supreme Court) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976)).
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have to spend so much time raising money is because they are allowed to
accept only a limited amount per donor. If donors could make larger
donations, more money could be raised with less effort and less use of
candidate time. Of course, this would exacerbate the potentially corrupting
consequences of large donations, so that raising contribution limits, while
less restrictive, will also be less effective in improving the quality of
government. So, a spending limit may be the least restrictive means of
advancing the time-protection goal consistent with also pursuing the anticorruption goals vindicated by contribution limits. 186
Thus, the more important question is whether reducing the time-burdens
of fundraising is a compelling government purpose. The time-protection
argument combines two distinct elementsthe impact of fundraising
burdens on candidates, and the separate impact on officeholders. For
candidates, the argument is that fundraising needs distort campaigning by
forcing candidates to spend time with potential donors rather than with
other voters. 187 According to this view, spending limitsprovided the
limits are high enough to allow for effective campaigningwould free
candidates to spend more time with ordinary, non-wealthy voters. This is
an attractive goal, but it is not clear that the government has a compelling
interest in determining how candidates campaign or which groups they
target with their appeals. Moreover, it is unlikely that the candidates will
actually ignore non-donor voters. Fundraising may require candidates to
give greater attention to donors and potential donors than their votes alone
would warrant, but all candidates will eventually have to aim their
campaigns at the voters, and not just at donors, since, ultimately, candidates
need votes in order to win. So the candidate portion of the time-protection
argument reduces to a government interest in the relative shares of
candidate time devoted to donors versus nondonor voters.
The crux of the time-protection argument, thus, must be the protection of
officeholder time. The original and most effective development of the
time-protection argument focused on the need to protect officeholder time,
freeing elected officials to devote more of their energies to the

186. Public funding would also arguably be a less restrictive means of protecting
candidate time than spending limits. Unlike spending limits, public funding actually gives
candidates funds, thus more directly protecting candidate time than simply capping the total
a candidate can spend. The reasons previously given in Part II as to why public funding may
not be appropriately treated as a less restrictive alternative are also applicable here. As with
the anti-corruption concern, spending limits and public funding could work well together to
protect officeholder time; they should not be seen as mutually exclusive.
187. See Landell, 382 F.3d at 119-24; Blasi, supra note 104, at 1282-83. I say “other”
voters since manyalbeit not allpotential donors are likely to be voters in the candidate’s
jurisdiction.
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policymaking activities that are at the heart of their public
responsibilities. 188 Yet, this argument, too, is vulnerable to the rebuttal that
the real time diversion for officeholders is not fundraising but the
campaigning of which fundraising is just a part. In other words, it is the
electoral process itself, or, more accurately, the need to run for reelection in
order to continue to hold office that diverts an elected official’s time from
the substantive responsibilities of office. It is unclear whether fundraising
takes up more of officials’ time than conferring with influential local party
and civic leaders, attending the events of economic, social, ideological and
media organizations, or meeting and greeting constituents throughout their
terms of office as part of the permanent reelection campaign. Yet, surely
the democratic accountability provided by the need to seek reelection is a
fundamental value of our system, not a problem. 189 To the extent that the
time devoted to campaigning does interfere with good government, there
may be less restrictive solutions than an expenditure cap, such as limiting
campaigning while the legislature is in session or limiting the number of
terms an official may serve, thus eliminating the distraction of a reelection
campaign from the final term. 190 More troubling, to the extent that it is
difficult to distinguish the time burdens of fundraising from the time
burdens of campaigning, the time-protection argument may be seen as
implicitly suggesting a skeptical view of the value of elections themselves.
Of course, it could be argued that seeking media, interest group, or
opinion leader endorsements, meeting with economic and social
constituencies, and frequent interchanges with the voters is a more
desirable form of campaigning than fundraising since fundraising focuses
public officials’ time on large donors while other forms of campaigning
address the mass of constituents or the groups that represent their interests.
But that counterargument is really a return to the candidate time-protection
argument which, as I have suggested, seems less than compelling.
To be sure, the time-protection argument has emerged as a powerful one
for scholars and judges alike. It has drawn the respectful attention of
Justice Kennedy, who has otherwise been generally hostile to campaign

188. See Blasi, supra note 104, at 1282-83 (explaining that fundraising efforts detract
from both the quantity and the quality of time a candidate can spend on “information
gathering, political and policy analysis, and debating and compromising with fellow
representatives”).
189. See id. at 1283 n.7 (explaining that constituents are “most actively engaged in
expressing their complaints and preferences” during elections).
190. I do not advocate either of these measures, or address the constitutional issues raised
by the first,, but merely use them to indicate that there may be other effectuve means of
addressing the time burden problem without limiting campaign speech.
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finance regulation, 191 and individual members of the Sixth and Tenth
Circuit panels, 192 as well as the Landell majority. 193 It accurately captures
the sense that the need to raise funds to match an opponent up to an
unlimited maximum can take an enormous amount of elected officials’
time and distract them from the business of government. Yet it is not clear
whether candidate and officeholder time-protection constitutes a
compelling justification for limiting candidate spending.

One aspect of the time-protection concern, however, may point the
way to a more powerful justification for spending limits. There is
considerable anecdotal evidence that the rigors of fund-raising have
contributed to the decisions of some elected officials to decline to
seek reelection, and, more importantly, have discouraged some
potential candidates from even participating in the electoral
process. 194 The burdensome fund-raising process, thus, can operate
to deny voters the opportunity to consider potentially attractive
candidates, while reducing the scope and intensity of electoral
competition. The costs of the current fund-raising system, which is
driven by unlimited spending, thus, point to a significant justification
for spending limits—the compelling governmental interest in
promoting competitive elections.
C. Competitive Elections
As the Association of the Bar of the City of New York has explained,
“[e]lections are about giving voters choices.” 195 A fair election allows
voters to choose among a number of contenders for the same position, and
also allows the candidates to compete for votes. 196 It is particularly
important that voters, when faced with an incumbent seeking reelection, be
able to consider challengers. The opportunity to deny reelection to
incumbents, and the possibility that in any given election the people may
exercise their authority to vote out current officeholders, is the ultimate
security of popular control over government. As Joseph Schumpeter once
observed, “electorates normally do not control their political leaders in any

191. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 409 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
192. See supra Part I.B.
193. See Landell, 382 F.3d at 119-24.
194. See Blasi, supra note 104, at 1293.
195. ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY: A BLUEPRINT
FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 91 (2000) [hereinafter DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY].
196. See id.
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way except by refusing to reelect them.” 197
Incumbents typically start out in an election with many built-in
advantages ranging from the free media attention they have received while
in office to the opportunity to use their offices to provide constituency
service and bring pork barrel expenditures back to their districts. These
advantages contribute to, and are typically reinforced by, an incumbent’s
superior fundraising prowess. 198 Interest groups and individuals interested
in having access to officeholders are more likely to give to incumbents
because incumbents are more likely to win, thus making their prediction of
incumbent reelection more likely to come true.199 Incumbents tend to
heavily outspend challengers, much as winners generally outspend losers
by substantial margins. 200 Moreover, an incumbent’s substantial financial
superiority may discourage potential challengers from entering a race
altogether. 201 In effect, the incumbent’s financial edge constitutes a form
of barrier to entry that reduces the competitiveness of our electoral system.
Potentially unlimited campaign spending aggravates this burden on
competitiveness.
By enabling incumbentsand personally wealthy
political newcomersto spend all the money they can raise, the lack of a
spending limit increases the ability of an incumbent or wealthy candidate to
financially outdistance opponents and also increases the amount of money
necessary to fund a competitive race. Landell’s repeated references to
candidates’ “‘pervasive war chests’” and the “‘arms race’ mentality”202
underscore this point, even if the Second Circuit’s focus was on the amount
of time it takes a candidate to build a war chest rather than the impact of a
large war chest and the prospect of an unending arms race in scaring off
challengers and narrowing voters’ options. 203 Unlimited spending can
reduce electoral competitiveness, particularly the likelihood voters will

197. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 272 (3d ed.
1950).
198. DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 195, at 91-92 (noting that “the statistical
likelihood that the incumbent will be reelected increases his or her ability to collect funds
from donors who want access to the winner.”).
199. See id. at 92.
200. See generally id. at 65 (citing Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for
Economic Development, Investing in the People’s Business: A Business Proposal for
Campaign Finance Reform, at 17, 67 (1999)).
201. See Blasi, supra note 104, at 1293 (noting that challengers are deterred by the
“formidable war chests” incumbents can acquire by accumulating PAC contributions).
202. See, e.g., Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d, 91, 121 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Blasi, supra
note 104, at 1287), 122 (quoting Vermont Lieutenant Governor Smith), 123 (describing the
testimony of public officials about an “arms race” mentality), 127 (referring to evidence at
trial and legislative hearings indicating a “widespread” arms race mentality).
203. See, e.g., DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 195, at 60, 74.
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hear from, and be able to choose among, candidates who are neither
personally wealthy nor favored by wealthy backers. By discouraging such
candidates from running, unlimited spending, rather than protecting speech,
may actually reduce both the amount and the diversity of electoral speech
that voters hear.
To be sure, a low spending limit can be anti-competitive. Indeed, there
is evidence that being able to achieve a critical level of spending is
essential for a challenger to be effective.204 An unreasonably low spending
limit can make it impossible for a challenger to get her name and message
out to the voters. But reasonable spending limits would have little effect on
most challengers’ spending and would primarily serve to limit the ability of
Reasonable
incumbents to wildly outdistance their challengers.205
spending limits could reassure challengers that the funds they are able to
raise will enable them to finance a race that is competitive with that of the
incumbent. So, too, such limits could cap the built-in advantages of
personally wealthy, self-funding candidates. With the knowledge that they
would not be dramatically outspent by incumbents or personally wealthy
candidates and that even limited fundraising success might be enough to
make them competitive, more candidates could be encouraged to enter
races. Thus, reasonable spending limits would advance the interest in
competitive electionsan interest that is constitutionally compelling
because electoral competitiveness is essential to the public accountability
that elections are intended to promote. 206
Nor is there a less restrictive means of addressing the anti-competitive
effects of incumbent war chests and the daunting advantages of wellfunded candidates than restricting the level of spending that candidates can
undertake. Public funding can enable a less well-funded candidate to get to
a basic state-determined financial floor, and so promote competitiveness.
But public funding can do nothing to limit well-funded candidates who do
not take public funding from amassing war chests that give them a huge
financial advantage and may even drive their opponents from the field.
Buckley did not directly consider the competitiveness argument for
spending limits, and neither did Landell. 207 Should the case come before
204. See generally GARY C. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (1980).
205. See ROBERT K. GOIDEL ET AL., MONEY MATTERS: CONSEQUENCES OF CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM IN U.S. HOUSE ELECTIONS 72 (1995). .
206. As with the prevention of corruption and the protection of officeholder time,
competitive elections could also be effectively promoted with public funding. As with the
other two goals, however, spending limits and public funding should be seen not as mutually
exclusive, but as mutually reinforcing.
207. Lucero, writing for the Tenth Circuit panel in Homans III, noted that the state
interested in promoting electoral competition is an “interest distinct from” the justifications
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the Supreme Court—or first return to the Second Circuit after a decision by
the district court on remand—the ability of spending limits to promote
competitive elections ought to be considered in determining whether
spending limits pass constitutional muster.
D. Voter Equality
The final interest worth considering in the debate over spending limits is
equality. Equality is a central premise of our democratic system. Over the
course of our history, the electorate has been expanded to include nearly all
adult citizens. The one person, one vote doctrine 208 has sought to ensure
not simply that each adult citizen has a right to vote but that each voter has
an equally weighted vote, and thus an equal opportunity to affect the
outcome of the election. Moreover, our laws most emphatically deny a
special place for wealth in voting or running for office. 209 Most states long
ago scrapped wealth or tax-payment requirements for voting, and the
Supreme Court has mandated the elimination of wealth-based requirements
for voting or running for office. 210 The role of voter equality in our
electoral system has implications beyond the actual casting and counting of
ballots. For an election to serve as a mechanism of democratic decisionmaking there must be a considerable amount of election-related activity
before balloting can occur. Candidates, parties, interest groups, and
interested individuals need to be able to attempt to persuade voters how to
cast their ballots. The election campaign is an integral part of the process
of structured choice and democratic deliberation that constitutes an
election.
The interest in voter equality is not directly implicated by unlimited
candidate spending. As Buckley explained, with limits on the size of
campaign contributions, differences in resources will simply reflect
differences in the size and intensity of support for candidates “and there is
nothing invidious, improper, or unhealthy” in that. 211 In other words,
equalizing the financial participation of voters in the election could very
well lead to differences in candidate spending if more voters give their

considered in Buckley and might be constitutionally compelling. 366 F.3d at 913; see supra
note 69.
208. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-68 (1964).
209. See Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972);
Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
210. See, e.g., Hill, 421 U.S. at 300-01 (invalidating requirement of separate approvals of
voters and taxpayers as precondition for bond issue); Bullock, 405 U.S. at 149 (invalidating
filing fee); Harper, 383 U.S. at 666 (holding poll tax unconstitutional).
211. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 56 (1976).
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contributions to one candidate than another. Nevertheless, the voter
equality concern can support one aspect of candidate spending limits that
would not be effectively supported by the anti-corruption and timeprotection concernsthe ability of personally wealthy candidates to use
their own funds.
In a footnote, Buckley acknowledged that its assumption that candidate
resources would reflect the size and intensity of a candidate’s support—
and, thus, not threaten voter equality“may not apply where the candidate
devotes a large amount of his personal resources to his campaign.” 212 But
wealthy, self-funded candidates are significant players in our politics, and
their large and growing role is due in significant part to Buckley’s
combination of contribution limits and unlimited spending. 213 These
candidates are uniquely well-positioned to spend money unconstrained by
the effects of contribution limits, and their resources have nothing to do
with the amount of public support for their campaigns. Democratic
equality is sorely challenged when a candidate can use her personal wealth,
which reflects neither the size nor the intensity of her popular support, to
become a major contender. Neither the anti-corruption nor timepreservation concerns supports the imposition of limits on self-funded
candidates since these candidates are not dependent on donors and need not
waste their time gathering funds. It is not clear whether the spending of
wealthy candidates can be limited solely in order to eliminate the
corruption and time-burden problems faced by their opponents. Nor is it
clear if the electoral competitiveness concern supports limits on the
spending of wealthy self-funded candidates since often, due to the
interaction of contribution limits and unlimited spending, wealthy selffunded candidates are the individuals in the best position to challenge
incumbents. 214 Only the interest in voter equality provides a sufficient
basis for limiting spending by self-funded candidates.
In addition, only the interest in voter equality could support limits on the
spending of noncandidates, such as independent committees, that may
undertake expenditures in support of or opposition to candidates. To be
sure, the Vermont spending limits apply only to candidates and related
expenditures undertaken by committees, interest groups, or individuals in
support of a candidate, 215 so there was no need in Landell to develop a
spending limit justification that extends to independent committees. Yet,
ultimately, the success of candidate spending limits may turn on a state’s
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 56 n.63.
DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 195, at 73-74.
Id. at 74.
Vermont Campaign Finance Act of 1997, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805.
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ability to impose reasonable limits on spending by outside groups. If
spending by candidates is limited, interest groups and politically engaged
individuals may shift their campaign funds from donations to candidates to
independent spending. Although independent groups have an important
role to play in presenting facts, ideas, and arguments to the voters, they do
not speak for candidates, they do not stand for election, and they are not
accountable to the electorate. The threat of unlimited one-sided spending
can create the same disincentive to candidate entry as one-sided candidate
spending. So, too, independent spending by wealthy individuals or wellfunded committees could win the gratitude of, and access to, the elected
officials who benefit from such spending, even if that spending is not
technically coordinated with the candidate.
Buckley rejected this
proposition, but it is uncertain whether the Court’s quasi-empirical hunch
about the limited gratitude likely to result from uncoordinated independent
spending is right. More pragmatically, some jurisdictions will be reluctant
to enact candidate spending limits so long as unlimited spending by
wealthy individuals and interest groups is possible. And only the interest in
democratic equality can provide a compelling justification for independent
spending limits.
Buckley emphatically and famously rejected the idea that equality can
justify limitations on campaign communications.216 But in Austin the Court
engaged in reasoning that closely tracked the voter equality argument when
it upheld the prohibition on corporate campaign expenditures. As Austin
explained, corporate campaign spending can “unfairly influence elections”
because a corporation’s campaign funds have “little or no correlation to the
public’s support for [its] ideas.” 217 In other words, spending that reflects
the corporate spender’s wealth rather than the extent of popular support for
its message gives the corporate spending an undue influence over the
electoral outcome. That is the voter equality argument exactly. More
recently, Justice Breyer, concurring with Justice Ginsburg in Shrink
Missouri, pointed out that “the Constitution tolerates . . . limiting the
political rights of some so as to make effective the political rights of the
entire electorate.” 218 Thus, Buckley’s rejection of equality concerns is itself
in deep tension with equality concerns voiced elsewhere both by individual
members of the Court and by the Court as a whole. 219

216. 424 U.S. at 48-49.
217. 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
218. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
219. Although Buckley ruled out limits on independent spending, the Supreme Court of
Canada recently upheld the limits imposed by the Canada Elections Act of 2000 on
independent spending by individuals and groups in Canadian elections. See Harper v.
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As Judge Calabresi nicely put it, inequality is surely the unspoken but
“huge elephant—and donkey—in the living room in all discussions of
campaign finance reform.” 220
The amelioration of the political
consequences of wealth inequalities is surely one of the driving forces
behind campaign finance reform. That concern should be taken directly
into account in judicial consideration of spending limits.
E. Democratic Elections
It is not clear whether any one of the arguments presented in this Part by
itself would be sufficient to sustain candidate spending limits from
constitutional challenge. The anti-corruption argument may be of
compelling importance but there are arguably less restrictive means of
addressing that concern, and the significance of elected official timeprotection in a political environment in which elections take a considerable
amount of time is debatable. To the extent that time-protection is
fundamentally a concern about the consequences of the extensive
fundraising that the current regime of limited contributions and unlimited
spending requires, the ability of spending limits to alleviate the rigors of
fundraising may advance the interest in electoral competition. Indeed,
spending limits directly promote electoral competitiveness by limiting the
ability of one candidate to financially overwhelm his or her opponents, but
no court has yet determined that promoting competitiveness is a compelling
concern. 221 Although protecting voter equality ought to be a basic
principle of campaign finance regulation, the relevance of voter equality to
candidate spending limits, other than limits on self-funded candidates, is
uncertain, and Buckley sharply rejected the idea that equality concerns
could be used to limit campaign speech. Ultimately the case for candidate
spending limits may require putting all these arguments together.

Canada (Att’y Gen.), [2004] S.C.R. 827. Judge Calabresi made equality concerns central to
his concurrence in the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc in Landell. As he
explained, equality is one of the “two principal values at play in the campaign finance
debate”—the other value, of course, being freedom of political expression. Landell v.
Sorrell, 2005 WL 826151, at *1. Indeed, Judge Calabresi found equality concerns embedded
in the First Amendment. As he explained, Buckley’s invalidation of spending limits enabled
individuals to “express the intensity of their political feelings . . . through money.” Id. But,
due to the “unequal distribution of wealth, money does not measure intensity of desire
equally for rich and poor.” Id. In his view, the Vermont spending limits may have been
intended to create “something of an ‘equal’ opportunity to express intensity of political
desire” and to use limits “to make sure that that intensity is not measured differently for rich
and for poor.” See id.
220. Landell, 2005 WL 826151, at *1.
221. But cf., Homans III, 366 F.3d at 913 (suggesting that electoral competitiveness could
be a compelling interest justifying spending limits).
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Landell suggests a framework for aggregating arguments that might be
inadequate when considered separately but powerful when taken together.
As the Second Circuit explained, the anti-corruption and time-protection
interests “overlap and might be better described as one interest‘to protect
the integrity of the electoral processthe means through which a free
society democratically translates political speech into concrete
governmental action.’” 222 That, indeed, should be the test. Does unlimited
spending undermine democratic elections, and are spending limits narrowly
tailored to advance the compelling interest in democratic elections?
The fundamental components of democratic elections are not limited to
the prevention of corruption and the protection of officeholder time.
Rather, they include the democratic values of electoral competition and the
recognition of voter equality. To be sure, democratic values can also be
threatened by spending limits. Limits can curtail the communications of
the spenders. By limiting such communication, they can limit the
information received by the voters. So, too, limits on candidate spending
can make it harder for candidates to engage voters in the electoral process
and mobilize them to come to the polls. In short, from a democratic
perspective, spending limits have costs as well as benefits. The assessment
of spending limits in light of the elements of democratic elections is, thus, a
complex one, and certainly more complex than the exclusive focus on the
potential for corruption and the appearance of corruption taken by Buckley.
But surely the rules governing campaign finance should be informed by an
awareness of the complex needs of electoral democracy.
CONCLUSION
The ultimate fate of the Vermont spending limits upheld by Landell is
uncertain. The Supreme Court could agree to take the case prior to action
by the district court on remand. 223 The district court on remand, or the
Second Circuit on appeal from the district court’s remand decision, could
conclude that, given the possibility of public funding for candidates,
spending limits are not the least restrictive means of advancing the
compelling interests the court found. The district court or the Second
Circuit could agree with Judge Winter that the specific spending limits
adopted in 1997—which do not include a cost-of-living adjustment, make

222. Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 124 n.18 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Nixon, 528 U.S. at
401 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
223. A petition for certiorari was filed on May 12, 2005 on behalf of the Vermont
Republican State Committee, the Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc,, and other
petitioners. See Vt. Republican State Comm. v. Sorrell, No. 04-1530, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/04-1530.htm.

BRIFFAULTCHRISTENSEN

2005]

2/3/2011 10:01 PM

RETURN OF SPENDING LIMITS

141

no provision for the costs of compliance with the campaign spending law,
and count related expenditures of third parties not simply as contributions
to candidates but as candidate expenditures, thereby eating into the
expenditures allowed by candidateshave become too low to permit
effective advocacy and are thus unconstitutional even if spending limits are
theoretically permissible. Or, of course, the district court and the Second
Circuit could find that the limits are constitutional. At that point the case
would almost certainly go to the Supreme Court.
Whatever the next step, Landell will have played an important role in
reopening the spending limits question. The three decades of Buckley have
created a campaign finance regime that, in its combination of limited
contributions and unlimited campaign expenditures, is inherently unstable.
Candidates and donors alike are driven to create and exploit whatever
loopholes they can find. Moreover, Buckley’s exclusive focus on
corruption misses many of the larger issues at stake in the financing of
election campaigns. Landell itself expands the range of judicial concern
somewhat by adding the impact of bundling and the value of time
protection, even if it failed to address such other critical factors as the
implications for competitive elections and the value of voter equality. But
in challenging even a piece of Buckley, Landell may have set in motion a
process of judicial reconsideration not only of Buckley’s specific holding
concerning spending limits but of Buckley’s broader framework for
thinking about the constitutionality of campaign finance law.

